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Introduction 
The following paper will be addressing the effect false news might have on systemic 
risk and sentiment indicators in the US. The topic was chosen for research due to the 
exponentially ubiquitous nature of obtaining information through internet in the field of 
economics. This advanced tool paves way for the accumulation of large amounts of information, 
as online news journals or social media websites, which seem to be the dominating source of 
news for most Americans (Gottfried & Shearer, 2016), lack adequate third-party filtering due 
to the rapid information turnover and countless independent users (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). 
As the information pool gets larger and more incessantly changing, it is increasingly difficult 
to filter out the false news from the real ones. The negative effect of false news is evident, 
although in some fields (politics) more than others (finance), as their spread is more rapid than 
that of real news, perhaps due to their provocative nature and pointed tone (Vosoughi et al., 
2018).  
While systemic risk is not a frequently discussed topic, its influential nature cannot be 
denied, certainly not after the financial crisis of 2008, which is, primarily, what prompted the 
concept to be put under scrutiny (C. T. Brownlees & Engle, 2011). The notion refers to the risk 
of collapse of an entire economic system, similarly to the financial crisis of 2008 or Wall Street 
Crash of 1929, due to an event occurring within the frame of one of its components, namely, a 
company (C. T. Brownlees & Engle, 2011); Kaufman & Scott, 2003). One might speculate that, 
in the event that false news, which, we’ve established usually aims to elicit a reaction, has high 
enough impact on systemic risk, manipulating it might cause drastic economic changes. 
Unfortunately, no study has been found to examine systemic risk alongside false news, 
hence no observed relationship is established between the two.  
Research question: does false news have any effect on systemic risk and market 
sentiment indicators? 
Research aim: find out if false news has any effect on systemic risk, and sentiment 
indicators. The research tasks are as follows: 
• Define the concepts of systemic risk, sentiment indicators and fake news; 
• Find what has been found to affect systemic risk and sentiment indicators; 
• Define research method and variables in the data; 
• Find the effect of fake news on systemic risk and sentiment indicators and compare 
findings to the previous studies. 
Keywords: statistics, correlation analysis, multivariate analysis, systemic risk, regression 
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1. Theoretical Basis for False News and Systemic Risk 
1.1. Definition of the main concepts 
The term “fake news” is nothing new, especially post US presidential election in 2016 
(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017), which is dubbed to be the high time for the “post-truth” 
phenomenon (Wang, 2016). Due to its popularity during this period, the term seems to have 
transformed into one that was widely misused as a superficial label, but was redefined by 
scholars as “objectively verifiable” term of “false” news, or rather: “any story or claim with an 
assertion in it and a rumour as the social phenomena of a news story or claim spreading […] 
through the […] network”, which “has been verified to be” “a distortion of the truth” (Vosoughi 
et al., 2018, p.1). Kogan, Moskowitz and Niessner (2019, p.1) define the term as “a form of 
disinformation, including hoaxes, frauds, or deceptions, designed to mislead consumers of 
news.”, while Allcott & Gentzkow (2017, p. 213) refer to it as “news articles that are 
intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers”. The latter two share the 
sentiment of the news being false intentionally and purposefully, while the former retains its 
objectivity and is content with verifying its fictitious nature.  
Similarly to the term “fake news”, discussion on the topic of systemic risk became 
heated after the financial crisis of the 2007-2009 (Borovkova et al., 2017), which prompted a 
debate over what caused it and how it could have been prevented. The research following the 
pivotal event concentrated on the components of systemic risk and the ways to predict it. 
Franklin Allen and Elena Carletti (Allen & Carletti, 2010, p. 3) describe systemic risk as “a 
situation where many (if not all) financial institutions fail as a result of a common shock or a 
contagion process.”. The concept entails collapse of the financial system, with emphasis on a 
component of the market failing to perform, thus, disbalancing the entirety of the framework 
enough to cause a financial crisis. The measure is difficult to quantify into one variable, since 
it ought to encompass the entire economic system, including all the different components: 
companies, banks, the government; measures: asset prices, component size, sentiment; and 
policies: monetary, fiscal. This leads to a lot of research being dedicated to deriving measures 
of systemic risk, designed to predict, and warn against the future threats of financial collapse.  
Sentiment indicators refer to the consensus on the expected market state, whether 
market has bullish (confident, optimistic that the prices will go up) or bearish (negative, 
convinced that the prices will go down) leanings (Palmas, 2020). Private and institutional 
investors cultivate opinions or sentiment about the state of the economy, which, when 
aggregated, form market sentiment. Sentiment indicators, such as Shiller Crash confidence 
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index (Barone-Adesi et al., 2012), bullish-bearish spread (AAII Investor Sentiment Survey | 
AAII, n.d.) or business confidence index (Leading Indicators - Business Confidence Index (BCI) 
- OECD Data, n.d.) are used to derive the consensus regarding market health and dictate future 
actions of the economy. General public often uses them as an indicator for allocating 
investment opportunities. 
 
1.2. Existing Literature on False News, Systemic risk, and Sentiment indicators 
In the modern age the news is often emphasized to be dubious in its validity, and while 
questioning the reliability of information is conducive to good journalism, the sheer size and 
spread of news datasets online make it impossible to establish a system for validating the 
entirety of the data. This is of consequence as the news holds significant importance in our 
perception of the reality, which is ultimately what dictates our actions. As such, news is bound 
to drive us to act in all matters, including the economics, making it subjective to changes in 
what news are delivered, as well as how they are delivered. Borovkova et al. (2017) offer a 
good example in the form of the UK referendum regrading leaving the EU, which was heavily 
influenced by the sentiment displayed in the news, effectively altering reality for the voters. 
Borovkova et al. (2017) focus on exploring the Thomson Reuters News Archive to construct a 
sentiment-based systemic risk indicator – SenSR – on the basis of “Systematically Important 
Financial Institutions (SIFIs)”, since these companies hold enough financial power to, in case 
of a destabilizing event inside of their framework, trigger a collapse of an entire financial 
system of a state (Borovkova et al., 2017, p. 3). SenSR is found to be a strong predictor of 
systemic distress up to 12 weeks before it takes place, proving that news sentiment has strong 
enough impact on systemic risk to be used as a predictive measure (Borovkova et al., 2017).  
The effect of news is not limited to short term decisions of the public, it also spreads to 
long term measures of market health. Heston & Sinha (2016) find that news sentiment has an 
effect on stock market returns, with weekly aggregated news having more prolonged effect, 
lasting up to a quarter, as opposed to daily news, which last only a couple of days. It can be 
speculated that the news has more of an impact over longer period of time, since the investors 
require more than one day in order to process the news and generate a response, or their 
response takes some time to affirm they have had significant effect on the market. The effect 
of negative news lasts considerably longer than that of the positive news (Heston & Sinha, 
2016), perhaps due to the combined impact of people’s inclination to dwell on negative 
feedback and the pointed tone of the negative news.  
FALSE NEWS AND SYSTEMIC RISK                                                                              7 
 
News stories have also been found to have “a systematic link […with…] the magnitude 
of the momentum and long-term reversal effect in its stock” (Hillert et al., 2014, p. 33), further 
corroborating that news sentiment is able to alter the investor behaviour and be an underlying 
cause of market momentum. Although the reaction to the news may not always be rational, as 
over-reaction has been found to precede a large change in the market (Hillert et al., 2014). This 
has also been found to be the case with systemic risk: on the example of the financial crisis of 
2008, leading up to large amounts of financial distress, the market sentiment shows signs of 
overconfidence and excessive optimism, as well as lack of anxiety (Nyman et al., n.d.), causing 
the investor behaviours to be being labelled as a “madness” in the beginning of 2007 (Barone-
Adesi et al., 2012). 
The period of 2007-2009 is also characterized by unusually high P/E ratio adjusted for 
inflation. Historical highs of the indicator reaching and staying 25 are known to be rare and 
have only been observed during the times of financial distress (Barone-Adesi et al., 2012).  
While the overall news sentiment has been proven as an underlying cause of investor 
activity and possible predictor of systemic risk, fake news has only been explored in the context 
of general effect on the market, its impact on exacerbating financial distress, to end up causing 
a full-scale crisis still unknown. Kogan et al. (2019) have brought out the impact of false news 
on financial markets by taking 3 datasets: a small, but comprehensive sample of 171 articles, a 
larger and more general sample of more than 350 thousand articles dating 2005-2015 and a 
qualitative dataset showing the response of the market to the release of false news. The results 
show higher degree of responsiveness to the fake articles, as opposed to the real ones, which 
seems to be a reoccurring trend through both theory and quantitative analysis (Kogan et al., 
2019). The days following release of a fake news article have 50% more increase in the 
abnormal trading activity than the release of legitimate news. Notably, “larger influence of fake 
articles likely stems from [them], by design, being crafted to attract more attention and 
influence.” (Kogan et al., 2019, p. 6). However, despite the initially strong response, the trading 
activity is found to remain unresponsive to news of any kind on a platform: legitimate or fake, 
after the public is made aware of the false nature of the released news content.  
Clare et al. (2019) find that despite generating more attention than legitimate news, 
possibly due to the reasons explained by Kogan et al.(2019), stock market reaction is 
appropriately faint, when compared to the reaction caused by the legitimate news. The conflict 
between the two studies could be attributed to the latter having a bigger sample size of 383 
fake news articles, as opposed to 171 in Kogan et al. (2019), as well as access to real investor 
reactions. Both studies use the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) crackdown of stock 
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promotion schemes in 2017, which exposed several hundred fake news articles for having been 
written on commission, with personal agenda in mind (Clarke et al., 2019).  
Barone-Adesi et al (2012) address the relationship between the asset prices, market 
sentiment and systemic risk. While the time between 2004 and 2007 is characterized by 
optimistic investor sentiment an overconfidence, as evidenced by the raise in several sentiment 
indices and optimism, the crash confidence index declined sharply after reaching its peak in 
the February of 2007, indicating that more and more investors started to realize that the market 
crash was imminent. Shortly after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which one of the major 
events leading to financial panic in 2008, optimism reached its new low, followed by systemic 
risk raising to 25% only wo months later. It is conjectured that sentiment played a big role in 
driving systemic risk upward by “fostering the climate in which systemic risk grew” (Barone-
Adesi et al., 2012, p. 3). 
Some papers have explored the cases of misinformation causing changes in investment 
allocation, one such example being the US stock market losing more than 130 billion USD due 
to a false tweet from the Associated Press, which was later discovered to have been hacked 
into (Rapoza, 2017). The study of Vosoughi et al. (2018), along with the aforementioned 
example, investigates the spread of false news based on the data of approximately 126 thousand 
stories obtained from Twitter from 2006 to 2017. Validity of the news is examined using six 
different methods, labelling a story false or true with a certainty of almost 98%.  
 
Table 1 
Overview of literature 
Author Year Source Data Focus 


















2003 – 2016 
Weekly data 
Constructing a systemic 
risk indicator based on 
media sentiment 
Kogan et al. 2019 Seeking Alpha; 
Motley Fool 
2005-2015 Impact of false news on 
financial markets 
Vosoughi et al. 2018 Twitter 2006-2017 Spread of false news 




2003-2010 Impact of news on the 
sentiment of stock 
market investors 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
FALSE NEWS AND SYSTEMIC RISK                                                                              9 
 
2. Empirical research on false news, sentiment, and Systemic risk 
2.1. Methodology and data 
The majority of previous literature base their news sentiment studies on the data 
obtained Thomson Reuters news archive studies (Borovkova et al., 2017; Heston & Sinha, 
2016; Nyman et al., n.d.). Heston & Sinha (2016) conduct their research using more than 900 
thousand news stories from the Thomson Reuters News archive, containing the publication 
date, story ID, news text, over the years 2003 to 2010 to extrapolate their impact on stock 
returns. In order to measure the sentiment of the news they use the Thomson Reuters NewScope 
data, which contains the time of the publication, staleness of the article, several indicators 
identifying and rating the relevance of the company mentioned in the article, as well as the 
measures of sentiment. The two datasets are joined through story IDs and times of publication. 
Later, summary statistics and cross-sectional regression analysis is conducted in order to find 
the predictive quality of the news sentiment. The news sentiment is aggregated to weekly basis, 
which increases the window of impact. (Heston & Sinha, 2016) 
Borovkova et al. (2017) choose to construct their systemic risk indicator from the 
Thomson Reuters news archive and Thomson Reuters Analytics Engine (TRNA) data spanning 
the period of 2003 to the beginning of 2016, including – along with the essentials, such as 
article date, headline, source, etc. – relevance score of the piece of news for a particular 
company, news sentiment score: a normalized indicator showing positive, negative, and neutral 
sentiment of the news, and novelty score. The sentiment is aggregated weekly, similar to 
Heston & Sinha (2016). 
Nyman et al. (n.d.) in their Bank of England working paper use three sets of big data: 
Bank of England internal market commentary, which consists of 26 reports on financial 
markets and system per month, during the span of 10 years, from 2000 to 2010; Broker reports, 
which is made up of 100 documents per month from 2010 to 2013, provides macroeconomic 
information regarding financial markets; lastly, Reuters News Archive provides 17 million 
English news articles on macroeconomic trends and makes up for the sentiment portion of the 
analysis. The former two of the data sources illustrate the state of financial markets during the 
span of 2000 – 2013, while the latter dataset attempts to complement them with the news 
articles released during that period and, thus, justify some of the major economic trends. 
Monthly sentiment of the text is calculated by subtracting the number of anxiety words from 
the number of excitement words and weighting the result with the size of the text. (Nyman et 
al., n.d.) 
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Heston & Sinha (2016, p. 2)  measure systemic risk with Marginal Expected Shortfall 
(MES) “defined for a firm as the expected equity loss per dollar conditional on the occurrence 
of a systemic event”. Sentiment of the market is measured by several sentiment indicators, such 
as: crash confidence index by Robert Shiller, Baker-Wurgler sentiment index and Campbell-
Shiller P/E. The study, after deriving their own measure of sentiment, proceeds to conduct time 
series analysis of the data. 
 
2.2. Overview of data 
Since the previous studies base their papers on Thomson Reuters News Archive 
(Borovkova et al., 2017; Heston & Sinha, 2016; Nyman et al., n.d.) or Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) fake news articles (Clarke et al., 2019; Kogan et al., 2019), the following 
empirical research should be conducted using one of these datasets. However, due to the 
hardships of obtaining data from both, and the easy access to a dataset on the website of the 
University of Victoria, a Canadian research university, it was deemed appropriate to use the 
one readily available (About the University - University of Victoria, n.d.). The dataset consists 
of fake and real news articles (only the fake news will be used in this research), along with the 
date of publishing, title, article text, and subject (Fake News Detection Datasets - University of 
Victoria, n.d.).  
Since the news dataset does not include the sentiment scores like the Thomson Reuters 
NewScope data (Heston & Sinha, 2016) or TRNA (Borovkova et al., 2017), we need to derive 
the sentiment of the fake news articles by quantifying sentiment of the text. There are several 
open-source lexicon-based analysers that are used for determining sentiment of a text by 
labelling the words within as positive, negative, or neutral. VADER (Valence Aware 
Dictionary and sEntiment Reasoner) is one such Python-compatible analysis tool (Hutto & 
Gilbert, 2014). The instructions for its usage are openly accessible and well-documented. 
Unlike other similar libraries, the tool takes into account punctuation, capitalization, slang 
words, emojis, and sentiment strength of the words (e.g. “okay” would be less positive than 
“marvellous”). The VADER analyser assigns three polarity values to each word: positive, 
negative and neutral. A weighted compound score is then calculated as a measure of general 
sentiment. The compound score is normalized to lie between -1.0 to 1.0, from extremely 
negative to extremely positive. The threshold values are as follows: 
• Positive sentiment: compound score >= 0.5 
• Neutral sentiment: -0.5 < compound score < 0.5 
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• Negative sentiment: compound score <= -0.5 
SRISK is one of the most well-known systemic risk indicators derived for measuring 
expected capital shortfall, given market decline of 10%. The indicator can be interpreted as the 
total amount of capital the government is expected to supply the financial system with, in order 
to halt a market crisis (C. Brownlees & Engle, 2016). SRISK is able to provide predictive 
measure for financial distress leading up to a crisis. Systemic risk index for this study is 
obtained from the V-Lab database (V-Lab: Systemic Risk Analysis Summary, n.d.). 
For the sentiment indicators, we have chosen to include Crash Confidence Index (CCI) 
which is a survey-based indicator, measuring the percentage of respondents who think that the 
probability of market crash being imminent in the following 6 months is under 10%. The survey 
question is as follows (United States Stock Market Confidence Indices | Yale School of 
Management, n.d.): 
“What do you think is the probability of a catastrophic stock market crash in the U. S., 
like that of October 28, 1929 or October 19, 1987, in the next six months, including the case 
that a crash occurred in the other countries and spreads to the U. S.?  (An answer of 0% means 
that it cannot happen, an answer of 100% means it is sure to happen.) [Fill in one number]” 
The respondents are divided into individual and institutional investors, although we will 
only be using the data for the latter, since it has been found to be more informative (Heston & 
Sinha, 2016). High values of CCI suggest that the investors are highly optimistic that market 
crash is not probable. 
Second sentiment indicator we will be using is AAII investor sentiment survey. The 
investors are asked the same question each week, regarding their opinion on direction of the 
stock market, which is then used to calculate the percentages of bullish, neutral, and bearish 
investors (AAII Investor Sentiment Survey | AAII, n.d.). We will be using the bullish-bearish 
spread (BBS), which is an aggregate sentiment of financial advisors. Negative BBS indicates 
that more investors are bearish than bullish, while positive BBS indicates the opposite. 
Business Confidence Index (BCI) has been chosen to represent the sentiment of the 
companies. Similarly to the other two indicators, BCI is a survey-based index and reflects the 
opinions regarding future developments “in production, orders and stocks of finished goods in 
the industry sector. It can be used to monitor output growth and to anticipate turning points in 
economic activity.” (Leading Indicators - Business Confidence Index (BCI) - OECD Data, n.d.). 
Optimistic outlook on the future business development is reflected with the numbers of over 
100, while the numbers below 100 indicate pessimistic outlook on future business performance 
(Leading Indicators - Business Confidence Index (BCI) - OECD Data, n.d.). 
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The obtained data is as follows: 
• Fake news sentiment (FNS) – obtained by calculating polarity scores of 23467 fake 
news articles from University of Victoria database (Fake News Detection Datasets - 
University of Victoria, n.d.) and aggregated on monthly basis. The data encompasses 
the period between the 31/3/2015 and 19/2/2018. The sentiment stays in the range of -
1 to 1, indicating negative and positive sentiment, respectively. 
• Number of articles – obtained by aggregating the number of fake news articles on a 
monthly basis. The values indicate how many fake articles are released each month. 
Data encompasses the same time range as FNS. 
• SRISK – (SRI) monthly data obtained from V-Lab database (V-Lab: Systemic Risk 
Analysis Summary, n.d.). The unit is in billion US dollars. Represents the amount of 
capital needed to bail the financial system out of market crash. High SRISK indicates 
high financial risk. The data encompasses the same time range as FNS. 
• Crash Confidence Index (CFI) – monthly data obtained from Yale School of 
Management website (United States Stock Market Confidence Indices | Yale School of 
Management, n.d.). Represents the percentage of institutional investors who think there 
is little probability of market crash being imminent in the following 6 months. 
Measured in percentage. The data encompasses the same time range as FNS. 
• Bull-Bear Spread (BBS) – weekly data obtained from AAII Investor Sentiment 
Survey(AAII Investor Sentiment Survey | AAII, n.d.). Positive spread indicates 
optimistic sentiment regarding the upcoming market movement, negative spread 
indicated pessimistic sentiment. Measured as the difference in percentage. Aggregated 
to monthly basis. The data encompasses the same time range as FNS. 
• Business Confidence Index (BCI) – monthly data obtained from OECD database 
(Leading Indicators - Business Confidence Index (BCI) - OECD Data, n.d.). Numbers 
over 100 indicates optimistic outlook on the financial performance, while numbers 
below 100 indicate pessimistic outlook. 
 
The data will be analysed in three steps: 
1. Simple descriptive statistics – to observe overall trends; 
2. Correlation analysis – to observe relations between the variables; 
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3. Multivariate multiple linear regression – to establish the impact our predictors (fake 
news sentiment and number of fake news articles) have on independent variables 
(systemic risk and sentiment indicators). 
 
Most of the data manipulation was conducted using RStudio, while most of the statistical 
analysis was conducted using STATA. 
 
2.3. Research results 
The data table (see Appendix A) represents the cross-sectional data gathered for this 
project. The table includes all the variables discussed above, as well as the number of fake 
news articles published in the respective month. The sample size for each variable is 35, which 
is rather small and could increase the risk of inaccuracy in the subsequent tests. 
 
2.3.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of FNS  
Source: Compiled with RStudio 
Before aggregating FNS into monthly data, we will first inspect its compound polarity 
distribution. As observed on figure 1, sentiment is mostly concentrated at the extremities, 
with about 40% of articles scoring below -0.8 and 32% of articles scoring above 0.8. The 
neutral sentiment does not seem to be prevalent among the fake news articles, which is not 
surprising, since, as previously observed, false news is designed to have a more compelling 
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and authoritative tone in order to attract more attention and response (Kogan et al., 2019). 
Excessive negative or positive sentiment is conductive to this aim. 
The distribution of the sentiment of the fake news articles over time can be observed 
in figure 2. Each news article is marked according to the subject of the text. We can see that 
the text sentiment is clearly concentrated on the extremities of the polarity compound score, 
which is also evident from figure 1, as well as the neutral score of 0. While the left-news 
dominates the year 2015, the beginning of 2016 sees a surge in the news regarding middle-
east, perhaps due to the political debates around the subject becoming more prevalent due to 
the elections. The articles labelled “News” also come to appear in the year 2016, although it 
is uncertain what exactly prompted the articles to start being recorded in this category. 
Majority of the articles are of the category “News”, closely followed by “politics” and  “left-
news”. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of text sentiment over time 
Source: Compiled using RStudio 
Table 2 presents simple descriptive data for all the variables. The measures include 
number of observations, mean, minimum and maximum values and standard deviation. Despite 
the large range of news sentiment in the daily data, table 2 shows that the monthly aggregated 
data appears rather monotone. Minimum and maximum values have changed to -0.223 and 
0.271 respectively from -1 and 1. This was to be expected, as aggregating data through means 
smooths out the noise and gets rid of extremities. While not ideal, aggregating data by months 
is necessary to normalize the data range across all the variables. Mean value of the variable is 
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negative, indicating that the overall sentiment of fake news has negative leanings, which could 
also be observed in the daily data. 
Number of fake news articles seems to reach its highest value of 1085 around the same 
time as SRI reaches 506 (see Appendix A), in the beginning of 2016, although they slowly 
decline after the peak. This trend can be observed in figure 3. While Crash confidence index 
remains in the midrange for the beginning of 2016, its peak is registered to have occurred in 
the end of 2015, a couple of months before SRI and number of fake news articles peaked. The 
indicator dips to its lowest value at the end of 2016. This movement can be explained by the 
previous studies finding overconfidence to be present in the market leading up to the financial 




Variable N Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
FNS 35 -.0605 -.223 .271 -.08899 
N 35 652.486 8 1085 329.445 
SRI 35 286.26 104 506 103.44 
CCI 35 34 25.41 40 3.31 
BBS 35 2.097 -20.28 19.1 8.74 
BCI 35 100.1 98.85 101.5 .82 
Source: Compiled with Rstudio 
 
 
Figure 3. Systemic risk and the number of articles over time 
Source: Compiled with RStudio 
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Highest standard deviation of almost 330 can be observed in the number of articles, 
perhaps due to the high variation in the data, which is also evident from the difference in its 
minimum and maximum values. However, this disparity is mostly present in the beginning of 
2015, with random variations throughout 2016-2018, all-while the sentiment remains negative. 
Bull-Bear spread, and Business confidence index retain raising trend all throughout the chosen 
time period. Their average values suggest that overall outlook on the financial performance is 
positive, as the mean of BBS is above 0 and BCI is slightly over 100 (see table 2).  
2.3.2. Correlation analysis 
We chose to use simple Pearson correlation for analysing the relations between the 
variables, since most of them are scale. The chosen confidence interval is 95%, since it is the 
default interval in most studies and there is no pressing need to change it, hence the alpha (α) 
= 0.05. Hypothesises are as follows: 
H0: Correlation is not statistically significant. 
H1: Correlation is statistically significant. 
p-value > 0.05 (α) - > Accept H0. 
p-value < 0.05 (α) - > Reject H0, accept H1. 
The value of the Pearson correlation indicates the orientation (negativity, positivity) 
and the strength of the correlation (correlation coefficient (r) < 0.3 => weak correlation; r > 0.7 
=> strong correlation).  
Table 3 
Pearson correlation scores and statistical significance 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1. FNS           
2. N -.26         
3. SRI -.07 .38*       
4. CCI -.02 -.24 .09     
5. BBS .13 -.34* -.49** -.08   
6. BCI -.08 .02 -.75** -.05 .43** 
Note. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.  
Source: Compiled using RStudio 
 
Table 3 shows the correlations between all the computed variables. The coefficients 
with an asterisk signify that the p-value is less than 0.05, while those with double asterisk 
signify that the p-value is less than 0.01, indicating that, respectively, we can be 95% or 99% 
certain that the correlation is statistically significant. From Table 3 we can infer that there is no 
statistically significant correlation between FNS and any of the other dependent variables. In 
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fact, the correlation coefficient is rather low for all of them, leading us to believe that systemic 
risk and sentiment indicators are not, in fact, impacted by FNS. We do, however, find that the 
number of fake news articles has a statistically significant, albeit weak (0.38), positive 
relationship with SRI and weak negative relationship with BBS (-0.34).  
Since the release of fake news is known to cause temporary reaction in the market 
trading activity (Kogan et al., 2019), perhaps this could be the underlying cause of the weak 
positive relationship between N and SRI, as well as the weak negative correlation between N 
and BBS. The causation could also be reversed: it is possible that the higher number of fake 
news articles are simply a reaction to large amounts of financial distress and negative sentiment 
in 2016, which was the year that saw Donald Trump be elected for the president of the United 
States (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). 
Statistically significant correlation can also be observed between the dependent 
variables. Systemic risk has strong negative statistically significant correlation with BCI and 
average negative correlation with BBS, which is to be expected, as sentiment about the future 
market performance is known to play a key role in driving systemic risk (Barone-Adesi et al., 
2012). The correlation between BBS and BCI is also statistically significant, which is to be 
expected as they are both indicators of market sentiment. What is surprising, however is the 
lack of correlation between crash confidence index and any other variable. 
 
2.3.3. Normality test 
In order to conduct regression analysis, we need to test the assumptions of the data. 
Normality test is conducted using Shapiro-Wilk test, due to the observations being less than 50 
The confidence interval is set to 95%. The hypothesis for the normality is as follows: 
H0: The data is normally distributed. 
H1: The data is not normally distributed.  
p-value > 0.05 (α) => Accept H0  
p-value < 0.05 (α) => Reject H0, accept H1 
 
We can see from the normality test (see table 4) that the p-value for all dependent 
variables is more than 0.05, indicating that we can accept null hypothesis and assume the data 
is normally distributed. While the independent variables are not normally distributed, since 
their p-values are less than 0.05, the regression analysis only requires the normality of outcome 
variables. This means we may proceed with the regression analysis. 
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Table 4 
Shapiro-Wilk normality tests 
Variable Obs       W V z Prob>z 
FNS 35 0.91144 3.161 2.402 0.00814 
N 35 0.89092 3.893 2.837 0.00227 
SRI 35 0.97853 0.766 -0.556 0.71076 
CCI 35 0.94224 2.062 1.510 0.06550 
BCI 35 0.92444 2.697 2.071 0.01918 
BBS 35 0.97990 0.717 -0.693 0.75592 
Source: compiled using STATA 
 
2.3.4. Regression analysis 
Chosen model for analysis is multivariate multiple linear regression, since we have 2 
predictor and 4 dependent variables. The model is as follows: 
Y1 = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ u 
Y2 = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ u 
Y3 = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ u 
Y4 = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ u 
Dependent variables: 
 Y1 – SRISK 
 Y2 – Crash confidence index 
Y3 – Business confidence index 
Y4 – Bull-Bear spread 
Independent variables: 
X1 – Fake news sentiment 
X2 – N of fake news articles  
β0 – constant regression parameter 
βi – regression parameter for input variable 
u – error 
n – sample size=35 
 
The hypothesis for the regression model is as follows: 
H0: the model is statistically insignificant. 
H1: the model is statistically significant. 
p-value > 0.05 (α) => Accept H0  
p-value < 0.05 (α) => Reject H0, accept H1 
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Due to the presence of more than one predictor variable in the dataset, we use 
MANOVA test to determine the statistical significance of the regression model. In the 
MANOVA (Appendix C) table we found that all four measures of multivariate analysis of 
variance - Wilks' lambda, Lawley-Hotelling trace, Pillai's trace and Roy's largest root – indicate 
that the model is statistically significant. While there is some variation in the p-values, all of 
them remain below the α value, leading us to reject H0 and accept H1. From the R squared of 
table 5 we can see that the model explains 17% of the variation in SRI and approximately 12% 
of variation in BBS, but only 6% in CCI and less than 1% in BCI. The p-values of the dependent 
variables present statistical significance of the model for SRI. 
MANOVA table also shows that the p-values of the predictor variables are divided: p-
values of the FNS appear to be above 0.05 in all four tests, indicating that the predictor variable 
is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the variable N shows the exact opposite – 
with the p-value of 0.003, the predictor is statistically significant to the model with the certainty 
of 99% confidence interval.  
Table 5 
R-squared, F and p-values of the regression model 
Equation Obs Parms RMSE "R-sq" F P 
SRI 35 3 96.91789 0.1737 3.364297 0.0472 
CCI 35 3 3.306378 0.0590 1.003309 0.3779 
BCI 35 3 .8436263 0.0071 .1149116 0.8918 
BBS 35 3 8.453348 0.1191 2.163209 0.1315 
Source: Compiled using STATA 
In order to determine whether the independent variables are statistically significant for 
predicting the individual dependent variables we conduct another hypothesis testing for the 
coefficients of the predictors: 
H0: βi = 0, the predictor is statistically insignificant. 
H1: βi ≠ 0, the predictor is statistically significant. 
Sig. (p-value) > 0.05 (α) => Accept H0  
Sig. (p-value) < 0.05 (α) => Reject H0, accept H1 
The coefficients table in Appendix C shows that all p-values for FNS are more than the 
alpha, meaning the independent variable is statistically insignificant for all dependent variables. 
N demonstrates lower levels of p-values for SRI and BBS, staying at 0.016 and 0.064 
respectively. While p-value for BBS is over 0.05, and, hence, statistically insignificant, p-value 
for SRI is well below the established alpha, which leads us to reject H0 and accept H1. We can 
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also assume that the orientation of the effect N has on SRI is positive, since both lower and 
upper bounds of confidence interval are above 0 (see Appendix C).  
The model is only significant for one predictor variable – number of published fake 
news articles (p = 0.0003) (see Appendix C MANOVA table) and one dependent variable – 
SRI (p = 0.0472) (see table 5). The variable has statistically significant effect on SRI (p = 0.016) 
(see table 6) since it’s p-value is less than 0.05, indicating that we Reject H0, and accept H1. 
The interpretation of the parameters are as follows: 
• Intercept: when all the other variables, in this case, N, are equal to 0, then the number 
SRISK is 212.2189 billion US dollars.  
• Number of fake news articles published: in an economy where the number of fake news 
published is 1 point (article) higher the SRISK, or the capital required to bail the 
financial system out of market crash is 0.1335259 units, or 133.5259 million US dollars 
higher. 
Table 6 
Regression model for SRI 
 Intercept N 
Coeff. 212.2189 .1335259 
Std. error 36.87041 .0523047 
t 5.76 2.55 
p 0.000 0.016 
Source(s): Compiled by the author 
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Conclusion 
This paper analysed the effect of fake news and its sentiment on systemic risk and 
sentiment indicators in the USA. The time period considered was 31/3/2015 to 19/2/2018. The 
paper made use of an open-source python libraries to quantify the fake news sentiment by 
applying a lexicon-based analysis tool - VADER - to the article text. After aggregating fake 
news sentiment, number of articles, systemic risk and sentiment indicators to a uniform 
monthly data we conducted descriptive, correlation and regression analysis to better understand 
the interconnections between the variables. 
We found that the negativity or positivity of fake news does not affect or relate to 
systemic risk or market sentiment in the US. After aggregating the number of fake news and 
crossing it over with systemic risk indicator, we found that there is statistically significant 
relationship between the two. A negative relationship also emerged between the volume of 
published fake news and the investor sentiment. After estimating a regression model to find 
the extent of this correlation we found that the volume of fake news articles has considerable 
impact on the systemic risk, leading us to believe that the volume of published material does 
indeed affect the amount of financial distress in the market. 
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Date FNS N SRI CCI BBS BCI 
2015-03-01 0.271 8 298 35.2 8.09 99.84 
2015-04-01 -0.167 309 276 34.67 6.89 99.8 
2015-05-01 0.021 302 229 34.04 0.67 99.86 
2015-06-01 -0.006 232 207 36.2 -1.21 99.85 
2015-07-01 -0.151 290 219 34.3 -3.77 99.71 
2015-08-01 0.004 219 317 35.52 -6.33 99.5 
2015-09-01 0.038 202 326 35.87 1.98 99.28 
2015-10-01 0.017 281 370 37.66 7 99.07 
2015-11-01 -0.104 275 308 40 9.55 98.91 
2015-12-01 -0.223 300 344 34.64 -2.45 98.85 
2016-01-01 -0.124 1081 384 34.52 -20.28 98.94 
2016-02-01 0.082 1017 506 35.58 -11.77 99.17 
2016-03-01 -0.084 1085 450 36.11 6.07 99.43 
2016-04-01 -0.063 975 436 34.92 5.48 99.56 
2016-05-01 -0.032 1011 384 33.49 -11.32 99.68 
2016-06-01 -0.192 868 427 33.55 -5.76 99.76 
2016-07-01 -0.108 882 448 32.86 7.1 99.67 
2016-08-01 -0.049 891 373 30.37 4.14 99.5 
2016-09-01 -0.092 891 304 27.82 -7.24 99.55 
2016-10-01 -0.081 1005 294 25.41 -7.69 99.73 
2016-11-01 -0.011 897 252 26.61 11.69 100.02 
2016-12-01 -0.007 834 170 30.57 16.58 100.36 
2017-01-01 -0.088 952 268 32.78 10.01 100.66 
2017-02-01 -0.142 825 240 32.24 3.41 100.83 
2017-03-01 -0.061 952 275 33.15 -4.83 100.78 
2017-04-01 -0.047 798 331 34.8 -6.6 100.61 
2017-05-01 -0.027 824 334 37.39 0.77 100.61 
2017-06-01 -0.116 813 155 38.22 2.14 100.8 
2017-07-01 -0.095 777 150 36.36 4.54 100.98 
2017-08-01 -0.143 795 211 37.43 -3.67 101.25 
2017-09-01 -0.021 636 198 36.77 7.59 101.43 
2017-10-01 -0.1 605 160 37.41 8.07 101.4 
2017-11-01 -0.133 523 145 33.87 8.69 101.36 
2017-12-01 -0.017 447 104 31.03 19.1 101.42 
2018-02-01 -0.065 35 126 28.78 16.75 101.5 











Source: Compiled using RStudio 
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APPENDIX C 
Multivariate regression model 
 
MANOVA 
W = Wilks' lambda      L = Lawley-Hotelling trace 
P = Pillai's trace     R = Roy's largest root 
 
  Statistic  Df F(df1,     df2) = F    Prob>F 
Model  W 0.4738 2 8.0 58.0      3.28 0.0037** 
P 0.5494  8.0 60.0      2.84 0.0096** 
L 1.0613  8.0 56.0      3.71 0.0015** 
R 1.0129  4.0 30.0      7.60 0.0002*** 
Residual    32    
FNS  W 0.9236 1 1      
4.0 
29.0      0.60 0.6656 
P 0.0764  4.0 29.0      0.60 0.6656 
L 0.0828  4.0 29.0      0.60 0.6656 
R 0.0828  4.0 29.0      0.60 0.6656 
N  W 0.4982 1 4.0    29.0      7.30 0.0003*** 
P 0.5018  4.0 29.0      7.30 0.0003*** 
L 1.0071  4.0 29.0      7.30 0.0003*** 
R 1.0071  4.0 29.0      7.30 0.0003*** 
Residual    32    
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05  
Source: Compiled using STATA 
 
Coefficients 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
SRI FNS 216.2898 193.6338 1.12 0.272 -178.1294 610.709 
N .1335259 .0523047 2.55 0.016 .0269848 .240067 
cons 212.2189 36.87041 5.76 0.000 137.1163 287.3214 
       
CCI FNS -1.647847 6.605867 -0.25 0.805 -15.10356 11.80786 
N -.0025175 .0017844 -1.41 0.168 -.0061521 .0011172 
cons 35.54692 1.257843 28.26 0.000 32.98477 38.10906 
       
BCI FNS -.7897432 1.685495 -0.47 0.643 -4.222984 2.643497 
N -.0000117 .0004553 -0.03 0.980 -.0009391 .0009157 
cons 100.0652 .3209402 311.79 0.000 99.41142 100.7189 
       
BBS FNS 4.686655 16.88908 0.28 0.783 -29.71528 39.08859 
N -.0087374 .0045621 -1.92 0.064 -.0180301 .0005553 
cons 8.081847 3.215902 2.51 0.017 1.531269 14.63242 
Source: Compiled using STATA 
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Resümee 
Vääruudiste mõju süsteemsele riskile ja arvamuste indikaatoritele USA-s 
Lana Botchorishvili 
Selles uuringus analüüsime vääruudiste ja vääruudiste arvamuste mõju süsteemsel 
riskil ja arvamuse indikaatoritel USA-s. Oleme valinud andmestiku mis koosneb 23467. 
vääruudisega artiklist 2015. aasta 31. märtsist kuni 2018. aasta 19. veebruarini. Kasutame 
sõnastiku-põhilist analüüsi paketti, et hinnata arvamuse indikaatoreid vääruudise tekstis. 
Avastasime, et vääruudiste negatiivsus ja positiivsus ei mõjuta ega seostu ei süsteemse riski 
ega turumeeleoluga USA-s. Peale vääruudistega artiklite kokku liitmist kuu kaupa ja nende 
süsteemse riski indikaatori arvutamist leiame, et nende vahel on statistiliselt oluline suhe. 
Avaldatud vääruudiste artiklite hulga ja investorite meeleolu vahel leidsime negatiivse suhte. 
Sobitades regressioonimudelit suhte ulatuse määramiseks leidsime, et vääruudistega artiklite 
maht mõjutab süsteemset riski tugevalt. Järeldame, et vääruudistega artiklite maht mõjutab 
majanusraskuste kogust turul.  
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